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Abstract
Recent work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) establishes an empirical mod-
eling strategy which takes full account of the structural, non-(log-)linear impact of
trade barriers on trade in new trade theory models. Structural new trade theory
models have never been used to evaluate and quantify the role of endogenous pref-
erential trade agreement (PTA) membership for trade in a way which is consistent
with general equilibrium. Apart from this gap, the present paper aims at delivering
an empirical model which takes into account both that preferential trade agreement
membership is endogenous and that the world matrix of bilateral trade flows con-
tains numerous zero entries. These features are treated in an encompassing way by
means of (possibly two-part) Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with
endogenous binary indicator variables in the empirical model.
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1 Introduction
The unprecedented surge of preferential trade liberalization since World War II spurred
theoretical and empirical work on the matter alike. Theoretical research illustrated under
which conditions preferential trade agreements (PTAs) induce welfare gains for partici-
pants.1 Econometric work confirmed that economic and political fundamentals determine
preferential trade liberalization through PTA membership very much along the lines hy-
pothesized by economic theory (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2004, 2009; Magee,
2003; Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2008): PTAs are most likely concluded among large,
similarly-sized, non-distant economies which have modern political systems. In part this
empirical work has even strived for an identification of causal effects of PTA membership
and found that, indeed, PTA membership causes bilateral trade.
However, from a theoretical perspective, there are two major discomforts with seem-
ingly all empirical work on the causal effects of PTA membership on trade flows. First,
general equilibrium effects are ignored. All of the corresponding work relies on the so-
called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) which requires that PTA member-
ship only affects PTA insiders but outsiders not at all (see Wooldridge, 2002; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). Obviously, this is at odds with general equilibrium. Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998) emphasize and illustrate that treatment effects can be severely biased
when ignoring general equilibrium effects. They criticize that the “paradigm in the econo-
metric literature on treatment effects is that [...] there are no spillovers [...]” and argue
that “standard policy-evaluation practices are likely to be misleading [...]”, accordingly.
Second, the extensive margin of bilateral trade is forgotten about and sample selection is
induced by focusing on log-transformed trade flows as outcome. This paper ventures for
an alternative approach which pays explicit attention to both of these problems.
We pursue an empirical modeling strategy which is informed by three influential
strands of recent empirical research in international economics: first, the work on em-
1The existing body of theoretical work on endogenous trade policy in general and endogenous PTA
membership in specific is by far too large to be discussed here. However, we refer the interested reader
to the excellent surveys by Rodrik (1995), Baldwin and Venables (1995), and Baldwin (2008), for details.
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pirical estimation of general equilibrium models where trade costs exert bilateral as well
as multilateral effects on trade and GDP (see Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003; Anderson, 2009); second, research on zeros in bilateral trade matrices for
any year or averages of years suggesting that the extensive margin of bilateral trade should
be modeled explicitly in empirical analysis (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; 2008;
and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008); third, the literature on endogenous PTAs
and their causal effects on trade flows (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2002; 2007; 2009).2
Interestingly, these obviously important three bodies of work are virtually unconnected.
This paper treats PTA membership as an endogenous determinant of bilateral trade
while allowing for (numerous) zero bilateral trade flows in the empirical model, and re-
specting both the bilateral and multilateral effects of endogenous PTAs on trade in the
quantification of PTA effects. In contrast to preceding work by Eaton and Tamura (1994),
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008), and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), we
allow (binary) determinants of exports to be endogenous. In particular, we suggest em-
pirical models based on pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with endogenous (binary)
explanatory variables.
We apply these models to a cross-sectional data-set of bilateral trade flows and their
determinants – among them a binary PTA membership indicator – for the year 2005. We
compute cum-PTA bilateral trade flows and compare them to counterfactually predicted
trade flows in a sine-PTA general equilibrium. Eliminating PTAs reduces trade flows
among members directly, but it entails also indirect effects on third countries through the
impact of PTAs on producer prices, consumer prices, and GDP.
Our findings may be summarized as follows. The results shed light on three poten-
tially large biases associated with the ignorance of the three mentioned issues: general
2The quantification of the effects of preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership has been a major
source of interest of empirical bilateral trade flow modelers for decades. See Tinbergen (1962), Glejser
(1968), Aitken (1973), for some of the earliest examples and Freund (2000), Soloaga and Winters (2001),
and Carre`re (2006) for more recent ones. Greenaway and Milner (2002) provide a useful survey. For
decades, the dominant paradigm in related work was that countries were randomly assigned to PTAs.
Only recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2004, 2007, 2009), Magee (2003), and Egger, Egger, and
Greenaway (2008) allowed for PTAs to be endogenous to trade in an econometric sense.
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equilibrium (third-country) effects of PTA membership; zeros in trade matrices; and the
endogeneity of PTAs. The biases are of different magnitude, though. Let us use the PTA-
related change of bilateral exports among members relative to nonmembers to quantify
biases. Then, for instance, a log-linear model of exports which ignores general equilib-
rium effects on top of the other problems leads to a bias of -186 percentage points or -79%
relative to the preferable two-part approach (which inter alia controls for the presence
of heterogeneous firms). A one-part Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model which
disregards non-random selection into positive exports and treats PTA membership as
exogenous leads to a bias of the impact of PTAs on members’ relative to nonmembers’
trade by -176 percentage points or -75% relative to a two-part model which copes with
all of the mentioned problems. A one-part model which acknowledges endogenous PTA
membership but disregards the problem of an excessive number of zeros in the data leads
to a downward bias of the PTA effect by about -73 percentage points or -31%.
Apart from these biases there are another two which seem relatively less important.
Disregarding the presence of heterogeneous firms appears less relevant than the mentioned
biases. A two-part model without heterogeneous firm controls leads to a bias of the av-
erage estimated PTA effect of -15 percentage points or -6% in general equilibrium. In
comparison, it is even less harmful to ignore that PTA membership effects are hetero-
geneous due to the variation in most-favored nation tariff rates. Ignoring heterogeneous
tariffs in the preferable two-part PTA model leads to a downward bias of the PTA-induced
effect of less than one-tenth of a percentage point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly introduces
the bilateral trade flow model we will rely upon. Section 3 points out three problems with
the implementation of that model in applied work targeted towards the analysis of PTA
membership effects on trade. Section 4 describes the specification and data. Section
5 introduces the modeling strategy to overcome these obstacles by treating zero trade
flows implicitly, and presents the corresponding estimation results. Section 6 derives a
zero-inflated gravity equation, lays out econometric two-part models, and summarizes the
estimation results thereof. Section 7 computes the impact of PTA membership as observed
3
in the year 2005 and compares it to an unobserved counterfactual situation without any
PTA memberships in the same year. The last section concludes with a summary of the
most important findings.
2 Specifying bilateral trade flows in the vein of An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003)
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a general representation of bilateral aggregate
nominal trade flows in new trade theory models with one sector and N countries. For
instance, such models include the ones of Anderson (1979) or Krugman (1980) with love-
of-variety preferences a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Their framework can be briefly
introduced as follows. Let us denote nominal exports of country i to country j (with
i, j = 1, ..., N) by Xij and refer to trade costs associated with exports from country i to
j as tij. Finally, use yi, yj, and yW for country i’s, country j’s, and world GDP (total
expenditures), respectively. Then, nominal bilateral exports are determined as
Xij =
yiyj
yW
t1−σij Π
σ−1
i P
σ−1
j , (1)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution among products (variants) and Πi, Pj are so-called
multilateral resistance (MR) terms for exporters and importers, respectively. MR terms
reflect multilateral (non-linearly weighted) trade costs firms of an exporting country and
consumers in an importing country are faced with. Empirically, these MR-terms are not
observed but they can be readily derived as implicit solutions of the following set of 2N
equations3
Π1−σi =
N∑
j=1
(
t1−σij P
σ−1
j yj/yW
)
; P 1−σj =
N∑
i=1
(
t1−σij Π
σ−1
i yi/yW
) ∀i, j. (2)
3Notice that the 2N equations have to be properly normalized to avoid multiple solutions to the system
of 2N equations (see Anderson, 2009).
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The structural representation of the model brings about a substantial advantage over
other, reduced-form (and partly ad-hoc) specifications of gravity models of bilateral trade.
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, p. 381) mention that “standard policy-evaluation
practices are likely to be misleading” if individual (in our case, country-pair specific)
choices affect others’ economic outcome, as is the case in general equilibrium models like
the one we are considering. “The paradigm in the econometric literature on treatment
effects is that [...] there are no spillovers [...] .” Since spillover effects from one country-
pair to others are at the very heart of the matter, a full account of the impact of trade
costs or PTA membership on exports in general equilibrium needs to respect their effect
on all variables on the right-hand side of (1): on trade costs as such (tij), on exporter GDP
(yi), importer GDP (yj), and world GDP (yW ), respectively (since they are a function
of trade flows), and on the exporter and importer MR terms (Πi and Pj), respectively.
Notice that the direct effects of trade costs are generally dampened by the MR terms as
illustrated in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Since direct measures of trade frictions tij are typically not available, one uses proxy
variables thereof. The bilateral distance between countries’ capitals (DISTij), a com-
mon international border indicator (BORDij), and a common official language indicator
(LANGij) are typical examples. In most empirical models of bilateral trade flows, trade
policy is accounted for as an element of tij by including an indicator variable of prefer-
ential trade agreement membership (PTAij). The commonly adopted assumption about
the relationship between tij and these proxy variables is
t1−σij = exp(β1 lnDISTij + β2BORDij + β3LANGij + . . .+ δPTAij). (3)
Substituting (3) into (1), we obtain the multiplicative model
Xij = exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj), (4)
where Zij = (1, lnDISTij, BORDij, ...) is a vector containing a constant and all trade cost
5
or trade facilitating variables except PTAij. Moreover, β = (β0, β1, β2, . . .) is a vector of
coefficients corresponding to the elements in Zij. αi = ln(yiΠ
σ−1
i ) and γj = ln(yjP
σ−1
j ).
In this model, the coefficient on the constant is defined as β0 = − ln yW .
3 Empirical problems with the implementation of a
structural gravity model
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggest estimating a stochastic version of (4)
Xij = exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)²ij, (5)
by taking the logs of both the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side and essentially min-
imizing the sum of squared residuals subject to (2). Alternatively, the parameters β and
δ can be estimated directly by treating αi and γj as fixed country effects. Given these
parameters, the 2N multilateral resistance terms in (2) may be computed subsequently.
Since general equilibrium effects are fully captured by the country fixed effects, estima-
tion of β and δ does not hinge upon the general equilibrium structure of the model. In
fact, it is well-known that the econometric specification (5) can represent a wide range
of (one-sector) models including the multi-country version of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
model, Eaton and Kortum (2002), or Feenstra (2004). Hence, most of what we will talk
about with regard to estimation below applies to a wide range of empirical models that are
informed by general equilibrium theory. The choice of the underlying theoretical model
determines the magnitude and transmission channels of comparative static effects but not
parameter estimates.
With parameter estimation, two issues may arise in such an empirical context. First
and most importantly, recent work in international trade emphasizes that PTA member-
ship should be treated as an endogenous rather than an exogenous determinant of trade
(see Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2007, 2009; Magee, 2003). Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
derived theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of PTA membership which work
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well in empirical applications. Yet, while previous work put great effort into identifying
the causal effects of (endogenous) PTA membership, the empirical paradigm has been
using microeconometric methods for program evaluation which prevent structural esti-
mation of the impact of PTA membership as suggested by equations (1) and (2).4 This
research thus assumed that PTA membership of one country-pair only affects this pair’s
bilateral exports but not those of other country-pairs. The latter feature is at odds with
both intuition and general equilibrium. We will show how model (1) can be adapted to
account for some endogenous trade frictions, still obeying (2). Obviously, such a goal can
only be achieved by means of instrumental variable estimation.
Second, depending on the data-set in use, the N(N − 1)-size vector X of bilateral
exports with typical element Xij may contain numerous zeros (see Helpman, Melitz and
Rubinstein, 2008) whose omission (by taking the log of the left-hand-side of the model)
would in general lead to an efficiency loss and to inconsistent parameter estimates. Some
authors have circumvented the problem of omitting zero trade flows by adding a small
positive constant to X, a transformation that enables logarithmizing all Xij. Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) show that this approach leads to inconsistent parameter estimates
as well. The severity of the bias resulting from this ad-hoc solution can be quite large.
Thus, estimating the model in its original multiplicative form (5) seems highly prefer-
able. Furthermore, multiplicative models as in (5) imply by construction that higher
conditional expectations go hand in hand with higher conditional variances. This pattern
of heteroskedasticity is a well-known stylized fact of trade data, rendering multiplicative
estimation of the model even more attractive.
We elaborate on these issues in Section 5, where we present an econometric model
of the gravity equation which is able to appropriately deal with both of these problems.
Before that, we describe our general specification and the data used.
4Previous work predominantly relied on Heckman-type switching regression models (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2002; Magee, 2003) or matching methods based on the propensity score (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2002, 2009).
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4 Specification and data
We broadly follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2008)
to model selection into PTA membership as a function of three sets of characteristics:
variables capturing political affinities or impediments to bilateral trade liberalization,
proxies for iceberg trade costs, and country size and relative factor endowments. We
classify two countries as belonging to a common PTA, if they were active since 2005
or earlier as notified to the World Trade Organization. The data were augmented and
corrected by using information from PTA secretariat web-pages and they were compiled
to obtain a binary dummy variable reflecting PTA memberships for the year 2005. The
three sets of exogenous variables contain the following elements:
Variables capturing political affinities or impediments to bilateral trade liberalization: Po-
litical scientists have pointed to a number of political factors which are hypothesized to
affect bilateral trade flows (see Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2008, for a brief survey).
The corresponding variables reflect characteristics of political systems. The associated
variables are based on the data collected in the Polity IV Project (see Marshall and
Jaggers, 2007). In particular, we include the absolute difference in a score variable,
measuring the autocracy of an exporter and an importer, respectively (AUTOCij);
5
the absolute difference in a variable, measuring the durability of an exporter’s and an
importer’s political regime, respectively (DURABij);
6 the absolute difference in a score
variable, measuring the political competition in the government of an exporter and an
importer, respectively (POLCOMPij).
7
Proxies for iceberg trade costs: Log bilateral (great circle) distance between two countries’
5AUTOCij measures Institutionalized Autocracy in a country. In the most extreme form, autocracy
suppresses competitive political participation, chief executives are chosen within a small political elite,
and once in office exercise power almost without institutional constraints. The source data vary between
0 and 98.
6DURABij measures the number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition
period without any stable political institutions in place. DURABij is computed for all years beginning
with the first regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred after 1800.
7POLCOMPij measures to which degree party participation is regulated in a country and to which
degree there is competition in participation. The source data vary between 0 and 98.
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capitals (DISTij);
8 an indicator variable which is one in case of a common land border
between countries i and j and zero else (BORDij); an indicator variable which is set
to one if two countries have a common language and zero else (LANGij); an indicator
variable which is set to one if two countries are located at the same continent and
zero else (CONTij); an indicator variable which is set to one if one of two countries
had been a colony of the other in the past and zero else (COLONYij); an indicator
variable which is set to one if one of two countries had been a colony of the other after
the year 1945 and zero else (CURCOLij); an indicator variable which is set to one if
the two countries had a common colonizer in the past and zero else (COMCOLij); an
indicator variable which is set to one if one country was part of the other in the past and
zero else (SMCTRYij). All of the mentioned trade cost indicators are taken from the
geographical database provided by the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII). The list of variables in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) did not
include (country dummies and) LANGij, COLONYij, CURCOLij, COMCOLij, or
SMCTRYij.
Country size and relative factor endowments: Exporter and importer country size in terms
of their log GDP as two separate determinants as well as all other country-specific de-
terminants such as population, capital-labor ratio, etc., are fully accounted for by fixed
exporter and importer dummy variables.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use non-linear transformations of exporter and importer
log GDP and include log total bilateral GDP and log similarity of bilateral GDP as
determinants of PTA. In addition, they include two measures of relative factor en-
dowment differences. One of them reflects the capital-labor relative factor endowment
difference between two countries in a pair and the other one captures the capital-labor
relative factor endowment difference between that pair and the rest of the world. We
recreated these four variables, although for reasons of data availability (the data-set
used here contains 15, 750 country-pairs while the one in Baier and Bergstrand, 2004,
8Baier and Bergstrand (2004) include a variable which is defined as NATURALij = −DISTij . Hence
the expected sign of DISTij is exactly the opposite of the one of NATURALij .
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covered only 1, 453 country-pairs) we had to use real GDP per capita instead of em-
ploying capital-labor ratios.9 However, capital-labor ratios are highly correlated with
real GDP per capita. While these variables worked well for the determination of PTA
membership, we ran into convergence problems when using these jointly for the PTA
and exports equations. We conducted robustness checks using two of them at a time
(not reported) to make sure that our reported results where not changed by their inclu-
sion or omission. In the specification used in the following sections, we omitted these
variables, as the detected patterns for parameter estimates were not affected by their
inclusion or omission in any substantial way.
Finally, our empirical model includes the following trade cost variables in Zij in
the nominal exports outcome equation (5): DISTij, BORDij, and LANGij, CONTij,
DURABij, AUTOCij, POLCOMPij, CURCOLij. Otherwise, nominal exports are a func-
tion of a complete set of exporter and importer dummy variables,10 and of (potentially
endogenous) PTAij. Data on bilateral exports in nominal U.S. dollars are collected from
the United Nation’s World Trade Database.
−− Table 1 −−
Table 1 summarizes mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the dis-
tribution of the dependent and independent variables employed in the estimated models.
Here, we would like to emphasize that about 37 percent of the cells of the bilateral ex-
ports matrix are zero and about 22 percent of the 15,750 country-pairs in our data-set
are members of a common PTA.
9Data on real GDP and population are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
10Which capture GDP and MR terms in (5).
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5 Estimating a gravity model with zero export flows
and endogenous PTA membership
For an assessment of the effects of PTA membership on trade flows, it is necessary to
obtain consistent estimates of the unknown parameter vector β and the PTA parameter
of interest, δ. However, δ does only reflect direct effects of PTA membership on exports.
To quantify total effects – which also account for feedback across countries consistent with
general equilibrium – we need to compute counterfactual exports without PTA member-
ship. The latter also account for the impact of PTA membership on GDPs and MR
terms as explained in Section 2. We will quantify the impact of PTA memberships by
comparing predicted exports of PTA insiders with PTAs as of 2005 relative to outsiders
with predicted relative trade flows in a counterfactual scenario without any PTAs. While
the corresponding simulation results are presented in Section 7, our first objective in the
subsequent sections is to consistently estimate β and δ.
5.1 Econometric model
Since the parameters of interest in model (5) are β and δ, terms αi and γj can be con-
sidered, from an econometric point of view, as nuisance parameters. The model to be
estimated thus represents a two-way country-specific effects model, where αi and γj sub-
sume the effects of GDP and MR terms, but may depend on other country-specific factors
as well. The appropriate econometric methods depend on the assumptions on the relation-
ship between (αi, γj) and the regressors, Zij and PTAij. If (αi, γj) were independent of
Zij and PTAij, random effects estimation would be consistent and efficient. However, the
underlying economic model suggests that αi and γj depend on Zij and PTAij. Therefore,
the model should be treated as a two-way fixed effects model.
There are two important differences to a standard panel data model, though. First,
this model is non-linear, and simple (within) transformations to eliminate the fixed effects
are not available. Second, since the data consist of all possible pairs of N countries, and
11
each country is observed as both exporter and importer, there are N(N−1) observations.
Hence, adding one country to an existing set of N economies gives 2N additional obser-
vations but only 2 additional parameters. It follows that there is no incidental parameter
problem, and the country fixed effects can be estimated consistently (for N → ∞) by
including a dummy variable for each importer and exporter country.11 This procedure is
computationally intensive, given the large number of 2N −2 fixed effects to be estimated,
but it is straightforward in its application.
The conditional expectation function (CEF) of model (5) is
E(Xij|Zij, PTAij, αi, γj) = exp(Z ′ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)E(²ij|Zij, PTAij, αi, γj). (6)
Under the assumption of exogenous PTA membership, E(²ij|Zij, PTAij, αi, γj) = 1 and
model (5) would be simply an exponential CEF model. However, acknowledging that PTA
membership is potentially endogenous, we want to allow for possible correlation between
the error term ²ij and the propensity to form an agreement. To tackle this problem we
implement an instrumental variable method based on the joint distribution of ²ij and
PTAij. Specifically, assume the following reduced-form equation for PTAij,
PTAij =
 1 if W ′ijθ ≥ vij,0 if W ′ijθ < vij, (7)
whereWij is a vector comprised of variables affecting a country i’s participation decision in
a preferential trade agreement with country j. The elements ofWij have been listed in Sec-
tion 4 and they contain all elements of Zij as well as instrumental variables excluded from
(6). Endogeneity arises if the errors vij and ²ij are not statistically independent. Follow-
ing Terza (1998), it is possible to derive a tractable form of E(Xij|Zij, PTAij,Wij, αi, γj)
under the assumption of bivariate normality of vij and ln(²ij), which leads to the following
11The classical incidental parameter problem in non-linear panel models says the following. Suppose
that data vary in two dimensions, one of which is small (with a fixed number of T units) and one is
large (with N →∞ units). Then, it is impossible to estimate individual fixed effects for each unit in N
consistently. Similarly, the slope parameters of covariates can then not be estimated consistently.
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expressions
E(Xij|Zij, PTAij,Wij, αi, γj) = λijΨij, (8)
with
λij ≡ exp(Z ′ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj) and (9)
Ψij ≡ E(²ij|Zij, PTAij,Wij, αi, γj)
= PTAij
Φ(ϑ+W ′ijθ)
Φ(W ′ijθ)
+ (1− PTAij)
1− Φ(ϑ+W ′ijθ)
1− Φ(W ′ijθ)
.
The last equality follows from joint normality of the errors, where Φ(·) denotes the cu-
mulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.12 The parameter ϑ is
equal to the square root of the variance of ln(²ij), multiplied by ρ, the correlation coeffi-
cient between vij and ln(²ij). If ρ = 0, the errors are independent, and Ψij = 1 so that
the conditional expectation of Xij in (8) simplifies to λij, which is exactly the special case
considered in (6) with E(²ij|Zij, PTAij, αi, γj) = 1. However, if ρ 6= 0, estimation of the
parameters β contained in λij will be inconsistent if Ψij is neglected.
13
The recent literature has suggested non-linear least squares (NLS) as well as various
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) estimators as the preferred approaches to estimate
multiplicative gravity models such as (6) with E(²ij|Zij, PTAij, αi, γj) = 1 (Santos Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006).14 These estimators differ in their weighting functions, and thus in
efficiency. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008) show that if the conditional variance of
the exports is proportional to the conditional mean, then the first-order conditions from
12Note that the assumption of normality leads to a Probit model for PTAij as is common in the
empirical literature. As for ln(²ij), which is an additive element to the linear index Z ′ijβ+δPTAij+αi+γj ,
it can be thought of as unobserved heterogeneity stemming from omitted variables. Assuming normality
here does not seem wholly unreasonable, since a case can be made for normality even if some omitted
variables are not normally distributed, as their sum would tend to be so by some version of the central
limit theorem if only the omitted variables were sufficiently numerous and independent.
13An alternative estimation technique which does not rely on bivariate normality is the GMM approach
of Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997). However, no comparable extension of this GMM approach for
the two-part model has been proposed. Our parametric assumptions allow us to extend the estimator to
the two-part model of Section 6.2.
14Under PML the information matrix equality does not hold and robust standard errors are computed
using the “sandwich” estimator involving the inverse of the Hessian matrix and the outer product of the
gradient.
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minimizing the squared errors of the model are numerically equivalent to the first-order
conditions of the Poisson PML model. Also, they find that the Poisson PML estimator
performs well compared to other PML and NLS estimators in a series of different Monte
Carlo simulation setups.15
Likewise, the parameters of model (8) can be estimated by non-linear least squares,
by minimizing the sum of squares of (Xij−λijΨij) as in Terza (1998), or by Poisson PML
estimation where the conditional expectation is now λijΨij. As before, the NLS estimator
gives more weight to observations with larger trade flows, while the Poisson PML estimator
gives equal weight to all observations. While both techniques yield consistent estimates
of the parameters if the conditional mean (8) is correctly specified, the results reported
in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) strongly encourage us towards viewing Poisson PML
estimates as more efficient. The Poisson PML estimator for the model with endogenous
PTA is implemented as a two-step estimator. In a first step, consistent estimates of θ are
obtained from a Probit regression of model (7). In a second step, we replace θ by θˆ in (8)
and use Poisson PML to estimate the remaining parameters over β, δ and ϑ. Second-step
standard errors have been adjusted to account for the variance of first-step estimates.
5.2 Estimation results
Using the data described in Section 4, we estimated the parameters of the structural mod-
els of Section 5.1 by Poisson PML. Table 2 displays estimates of three alternative models
of nominal bilateral exports in U.S. dollars (Xij). Column (2) summarizes estimates from
a na¨ıve log-linear model which simply drops all data points for which bilateral exports are
zero and treats PTA membership as exogenous. Obviously, the corresponding estimates
in column (2) differ quite starkly from the ones in columns (3) and (5) and so do their
comparative static effects so that we will dismiss this estimator and not refer to it further
15Alternative consistent estimators include other members of the linearized exponential family such
as the normal PML model or the gamma PML model. The negative binomial model is not a linear
exponential family unless the dispersion parameter is set to an arbitrary constant. We do not report
such other estimates since, with our data and specifications, their numerical properties were poor and
convergence was hard to achieve, the likely reason being the presence of numerous fixed effects to which
the Poisson PML estimator appears to be less sensitive to.
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in the subsequent discussion. Column (3) reports parameters and robust standard errors
of a Poisson PML model that treats PTAij as exogenous. In column (5), PTAij is allowed
to be endogenous. For this, we used a first-stage probit model based on the covariates
mentioned in Section 4 and summarized in column (4) of Table 2. In principle, the model
for endogenous PTAs does not need instruments to be identified if the distributional as-
sumptions are met. As we did not wish to rely on functional form alone, we excluded a
subset of the first-stage variables Wij from the set of second stage variables Zij to act as
instruments.
The instruments should have an effect on the probability to form a PTA, but they
should not have other, direct effects on exports. The first assumption can be tested by
performing an F-test on the joint relevance of the instruments in the reduced-form equa-
tion in column (4). We test the second assumption in two ways. On the one hand, we
include them as additional regressors in the outcome equation and test for their relevance
on outcome beyond their role for PTA. We do so by performing F-tests on the joint
relevance of the instruments in the model in column (5). Moreover, we test whether the
instruments pass a conventional test for overidentifying restrictions in a log-linearized ver-
sion of the model for positive exports. The variables COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY
are significant determinants of PTA as can be seen from the low p-value of the reported
F statistic in column (4), and they pass the tests for instrument validity according to the
insignificant F-tests on overidentifying restrictions in column (5). Hence, countries are
more likely to select into PTA membership given a shared colonial past, but – after con-
trolling for other determinants of trade flows – these determinants do not directly affect
trade.16
−− Table 2 −−
The results in Table 2 suggest the following conclusions. First of all, selection into
PTAs based on observables is positive for some variables such as CONT and CURCOL:
16In contrast to this, more recent colonial ties (CURCOL, which measures colonizing after 1945) do
have a significant impact on trade beyond influencing PTA membership.
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these factors raise the probability of joining a PTA and also tend to have a trade-increasing
effect, implying that particularly those country-pairs which display a high level of goods
trade flows select into PTAs anyway. Notice that this result is consistent with the hypoth-
esis in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) according to which PTAs exhibit the highest welfare
gains in countries where bilateral trade flows would be (and are) large. However, there
are also variables which negatively affect both selection into PTAs as well as bilateral
exports: examples are DIST and DURAB. Finally, there are observables which have the
opposite impact on selection into PTAs and on exports: for instance, BORD, LANG, and
POLCOMP, affect selection into PTAs negatively but exports positively; on the contrary,
AUTOC affects selection into PTAs positively but exports negatively.
Second, there is evidence for selection into PTAs on unobservables. Endogeneity of
PTAij can be assessed by a simple t-test on ϑˆ, an estimate of the (scaled) correlation
between PTAij and the stochastic error in the exports. If PTAij is exogenous, the corre-
lation must be zero, so that the null hypothesis ϑ = 0 provides a valid test for exogeneity.
We find that ϑˆ is negative and significant, thus rejecting exogeneity of PTAij. A negative
ϑ indicates that unobservables (i.e., bilateral factors other than the economic and politic
determinants which we include in our models) favoring the creation of a PTA on average
come along with unobservables that have a negative impact on bilateral trade. This nega-
tive self-selection based on unobservables leads to a downward bias in the estimated PTA
parameter: the point estimate increases as we abandon the assumption of exogeneity. The
remaining parameters are fairly stable across columns (3) and (5).
The results from the probit estimation for the reduced-form equation of PTA are
broadly in line with comparable previous work. The political variables DURAB, POL-
COMP and AUTOC turn out to be important for the decision to join a PTA as in Egger,
Egger, and Greenaway (2008).17 These variables were not included in the models of Magee
(2003) or Baier and Bergstrand (2004), nor were the colonial history variables. However,
17They are also important determinants of trade flows. In general, discrepancies on the levels of political
competition, autocracy and durability reduce the probability of forming a PTA and the volume of trade.
However, this fails for the difference in autocracy, which has a positive effect on PTA, and the difference
in political competition which appears to increase exports.
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the finding of statistically significant effects of a positive influence if countries are on the
same continent (CONT) is consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2004), and the nega-
tive effect of distance is in line with both Baier and Bergstrand’s (2004) cross-sectional
analysis and Magee’s (2003) cross-section and panel results.
6 Modeling zero trade flows explicitly
In our data set, about 37.2 percent of all entries in the bilateral trade matrix were zeroes.
The previous approach accommodated those zero trade flows implicitly. We did not need
to exclude non-trading country-pairs, nor did we artificially change the source data (e.g.,
by adding a positive constant to all export flows as in Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006)
to allow for log-linearization. Yet the high incidence of zero trade makes it potentially
interesting to split the overall effect of PTA membership on expected trade volumes into
its two component parts, an effect at the extensive country margin of exports – i.e., the
number of pairings which started exporting because of PTA membership – and the effect
at the the intensive country margin – the extent to which PTA membership raised exports
among pairs that traded already.
The focus on country margins is different from the recent emphasis on firm margins
introduced by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). In their model, trade volumes
(our intensive country margin) can change due to new (and less productive) firms entering
into export markets, or due to existing firms expanding their activities. For our analysis,
this distinction is unimportant, as both effects are part of the causal pathway from PTA
membership to increased country trade volumes, and we are interested in this overall
effect.
To motivate our econometric specification of a two-part gravity model, we therefore
consider a model of symmetric monopolistically competitive firms, as in Krugman (1980),
thereby neglecting firm heterogeneity. In that model the extent of fixed bilateral market
entry costs relative to operating profits in a market governs a firm’s decision to serve the
target market via exports or not.
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6.1 Theoretical model
Let us denote export-market specific fixed costs for firm b in country i to deliver goods
to market j by fj(b). Each firm b supplies a single variety of the product and faces
market-specific profits pij(b) in country j = 1, ..., N of
pij(b) = [pˆj(b)− zˆj(b)]cj(b)− fj(b). (10)
In equation (10), pˆj(b) denotes the consumer price of variant b and zˆj(b) are the associated
marginal costs of supplying variant b to consumers in j (including marginal production
costs and trade costs). Unlike Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), let us assume
for the model outset that all producers in country i are symmetric with respect to zˆj(b)
and fj(b).
18 As a consequence, we may drop product index b throughout our analysis
and index products by their country of origin. Then, we may substitute pij(b) = piij,
pˆj(b) = pˆij, zˆj(b) = zˆij, cj(b) = cij, and fj(b) = fij for all variants delivered by i-borne
producers to consumers in j.
Firms in i will now maximize profits across all markets by setting identical mill prices
pi for consumers everywhere. With iceberg-type trade costs tij for exports from i to j,
the relationship between consumer prices and mill prices is determined as pˆij = pitij.
Similarly, marginal delivery costs relate to marginal production costs by zˆij = zitij, and
shipments at the firm level may be defined as xij ≡ cijtij = p−σi t1−σij P σ−1j yj.
Accordingly, we may rewrite equation (10) as
piij = (pi − zi)xij − fij. (11)
Notice that fixed entry costs fij are specific to an import market. Consequently, i-borne
firms will decide to supply goods to consumers in j only if operating profits (pi−zi)xij cover
the market-specific fixed costs fij. With monopolistic competition, a constant elasticity
18We will estimate some models below that accommodate the case of heterogeneous firms. This can be
done by introducing a polynomial control function which is based on the linear predictions in the extensive
margin model, similar to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). See below for further details.
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of substitution σ between products, and a fixed markup over marginal production costs,
operating profits per unit of output are (pi − zi) = pi/σ and i-borne firms will supply
market j only if pixij ≥ σfij. Let us define an indicator function Iij which is unity, if
pixij ≥ σfij, and zero else. After defining the number of producers in country i as ni, we
may write aggregate nominal goods exports from i to j in equilibrium as
nipixij ≡ Xij = Iijnip1−σi t1−σij P σ−1j yj. (12)
As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), a country’s world (including intranational)
sales add up to GDP and we may state:
yi = (nip
1−σ
i )
N∑
j=1
(
Iijt1−σij P
σ−1
j yj
)
. (13)
Now, after defining yW =
∑N
i=1 yi, we may substitute (nip
1−σ
i ) by yi/yWΠ
1−σ
i in (12)
to obtain an equivalent expression for nominal aggregate bilateral exports to the one in
equation (1). Yet, unlike in (1), zero bilateral exports may surface in the non-stochastic
part of the model:
Xij = Iij
yiyj
yW
t1−σij Π
σ−1
i P
σ−1
j . (14)
Analogous to the discussion in Section 2, the unobserved Π1−σi and P
1−σ
j can be computed
as implicit solutions to the system of 2N equations
Π1−σi =
N∑
j=1
(
Iijt1−σij P
σ−1
j yj/yW
)
; P 1−σj =
N∑
i=1
(
Iijt1−σij Π
σ−1
i yi/yW
)
, (15)
where Π1−σi and P
1−σ
j are the equivalent expressions to the ones in equation (2), but
allowing for zero trade flows.
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6.2 An empirical two-part model of trade
We consider now estimation of a stochastic version of the gravity model with zero trade
flows as in (14):
Xij = Iij exp(Z ′ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)²ij. (16)
Taking expectations and using the law of iterated expectations we can write the CEF as
E(Xij|·) = Pr(Iij = 1|·)E(exp(Z ′ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)²ij|·, Iij = 1)
= Pr(Iij = 1|·)E(Xij|·, Iij = 1). (17)
This is a two-part model which allows to decompose the effects of the explanatory variables
on exports into an effect on the extensive country margin – i.e., the decision to export to
a country at all – and on the intensive margin – i.e., on the value of exports conditional on
positive exports. In the baseline model (8), the estimated effect represents some average
of these two. Two-part econometric models have been discussed in econometrics for some
time (Cragg, 1971; Duan, Manning, Morris, and Newhouse, 1983), but have not been
implemented in the empirical trade literature so far, to the best of our knowledge.
To complete the specification of the two-part model and make it operational, functional
forms for the probability of trading and the expected trading volume have to be defined.
Retaining endogeneity of PTA in exports, we postulate for the second part of (17) a
similar relationship as the one used before,
E(Xij|Zij,Wij, PTAij, Iij = 1) = λijΨij, (18)
where λij and Ψij are analogous to the expressions in (9). However, note that as this
functional form is now assumed to hold for positive exporters only, and not for all obser-
vations as in (8)-(9), the parameters β, δ and ϑ in (18) do not denote the same quantities
as in the model of Section 5.
Let us now turn to the first part of the model, the probability of country i to serve
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country j via exports at all. For this purpose, the model for Iij as defined by equation
(11) is translated into a stochastic process
Iij =
 1 if Q′ijω + κPTAij ≥ ξij,0 else, (19)
where the vector Qij is a set of observable variables determining positive exports (i.e.,
positive profits for firms in i which are specific to market j), ω are the corresponding
unknown parameters, κ is the parameter of the PTA indicator variable, and ξij is a
stochastic term. Note that Qij may but need not contain the same elements as Zij. Since
PTA membership is an endogenous determinant of the positive value of exports, it would
be awkward to assume that it is exogenous to the decision to export at all from i to
j. Therefore, we explicitly allow for dependence between ξij and PTAij. With a binary
dependent variable (Iij) and a binary endogenous regressor (PTAij) at hand, we follow a
large literature in modeling the two binary processes by means of a bivariate probit model
(cf. Monfardini and Radice, 2008, for some recent applications). Then, the probability of
trading conditional on PTA membership can be written as (see, e.g., Greene, 2008)
Pr(Iij = 1|Qij,Wij, PTAij) = (20)
Φ2[(2PTAij − 1)W ′ijθ,Q′ijω + κPTAij, (2PTAij − 1)ρvξ]
Φ[(2PTAij − 1)W ′ijθ]
,
where Φ2 denotes the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and ρvξ the cor-
relation between v and ξ.
Thus, the impact of a variable on the CEF (17) is modeled in a very flexible manner
in the two-part model, allowing a variable to have different effects in each part of the two
components of (17). For instance, it is possible for a variable to have a strong impact on
the extensive country margin – the probability of initiating exports to a given country
which is determined mainly by ω and κ at given Qij and PTAij – but to have a small
impact on the intensive margin – an increase of the value of positive bilateral exports
resulting principally from β at given regressors.
21
A convenience of such a model is that the two parts, (18) and (20), can be estimated
separately. Thus, consistent estimates of the parameters of (20), ω, κ, θ as well as the
degree of endogeneity of PTA (as measured by the correlation between PTA and ξij) can
be obtained by standard maximum likelihood estimation. As for the parameters from
(18), we can use the same two-stage PML procedures described in Section 5, and include
only the observations with positive exports in the estimation.
6.3 A two-part model with correlated errors and firm
heterogeneity
The two-part model presented in the previous sub-section differs from alternative ap-
proaches suggested in the recent literature to discriminate between effects at the extensive
and intensive country margins of trade. The dominant procedure in the current literature
is to estimate some form of sample selection model (see Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein,
2008, and Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2008), most often a log-linear Heckit model.
While it is generally acknowledged that the statistical properties and robustness of
sample selection models are often inferior to the ones of the two-part model (Duan, Man-
ning, Morris, and Newhouse, 1984; Manning, Duan and Rogers, 1987; Leung and Yu,
1996; Dow and Norton, 2003), proponents of sample selection models have advocated the
use of the former over the latter based on its explicit modeling of the correlation structure
between the errors in the two equations.19 The two-part model does not estimate any
covariance terms between two error vectors. However, it is consistent under some general
classes of joint distributions which allow for stochastic dependence between error terms.
In particular, the two-part model allows for joint distributions of the errors which are
excluded by assumption under sample selection models (see Duan, Manning, Morris and
Newhouse, 1984). If the error terms are independent across the participation and out-
come equations, the two-part model is efficient relative to the sample selection model. If
the errors are not independent, it is difficult to decide between two-part versus selection
19The participation equation which, in our case, corresponds to the extensive country margin model of
trade, and the outcome equation which corresponds to the intensive country margin model.
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models as they are not nested.
We decided to address correlated disturbances between the intensive and extensive
margin by estimating an additional two-part model with a semiparametric control-function.
We follow Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) to postulate that the disturbances of
the two models are independent conditional on some nonlinear function of the predictions
of the extensive margin equation. In the Heckit approach taken by Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008), the linear prediction of the extensive margin model enters in a
nonlinear form by inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio, i.e., the ratio of the probability
density function and the cumulative normal distribution function evaluated at the linear
prediction of the participation equation. We denote this linear prediction by
η̂ij ≡ Q′ijω̂ + κˆPTAij
In our application, the inverse Mills’ ratio would not contribute significantly to the ex-
planatory power since it is almost linear over a large part of the relevant range of its
argument.20
Thus, we model the correlation among disturbances conditional on a nonlinear func-
tion of ηˆij by including polynomial terms up to a fourth order (excluding the linear term
for reasons of collinearity). Not only is this approach more flexible than the inclusion of
the Mills’ ratio alone, but it also has the added advantage that the polynomial control
function captures possible nonlinearities due to the firm extensive margin. Such additional
nonlinearities are present if firms are in fact heterogenous. Notice that either problem is
addressed by a (slightly different) nonlinear function about η̂ij also in Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008). We argue that the fourth-order polynomial in η̂ij is a flexible
approximation of both nonlinear functions. While within this semiparametric approach it
20This is true for the models we report below as well as ones that use religion as in Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008) as an identifying instrument in the participation equation for the extensive country
margin of exports. The coefficient estimates are very robust to the inclusion of religion as an identifying
instrument for the extensive country margin of exports. However, we report results which exclude this
variable for the sake of keeping an additional 506 observations in the sample for which the religion variable
is not available.
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is impossible to distinguish between error correlation and firm heterogeneity, this is irrele-
vant for our purpose of analyzing country margins of trade.21 The (combined) presence of
error correlation and firm heterogeneity can be tested for by an F-test of joint significance
on the coefficients of the approximating polynomial function.
6.4 Estimation results
In this subsection, we discuss the parameter estimates from the models described in
Subsections 6.2 and 6.3. Similar to Table 2, Table 3 summarizes the estimates of two
alternative models of nominal bilateral exports in U.S. dollars (Xij). Again, every column
gives parameters and standard errors of covariates of interest in the pertinent equations.
Yet, now we distinguish between the process generating zero versus positive exports on
the one hand, and the process generating alternative positive values of exports on the
other. The former is captured by a probit model for Iij as explained in Section 6.2, while
the latter is estimated via Poisson PML.
Columns (2) to (4) give parameters and standard errors when treating PTAij as exoge-
nous. Both column (3) and (4) represent trade volume equations. The difference between
those two is that the model in column (4) controls for higher-order polynomial terms in
η̂ij while the one in (3) does not. Hence, the specification in (4) implicitly accommodates
correlation between the disturbances of the extensive country margin equation in column
(2) and the intensive country margin model in column (3) as well as heterogeneous firms
akin to the approach of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). In columns (6) to (8),
we treat PTAij as endogenous. To model this, in addition to the two equations for Iij
and exports, a third equation for PTA is needed. Endogeneity of PTAij in Iij is captured
by a recursive bivariate probit model as summarized in columns (5) and (6). While we
use the same specification for the latent process behind the extensive country margin Iij
(i.e., the process ηij) as for positive exports (or E(Xij|Xij > 0)), the results are virtually
identical to a model where we use religion as an additional regressor in the extensive
21This is in contrast to work analyzing firm margins of trade, for which the distinction between firm
extensive margin and error correlation is crucial (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008).
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margin model as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). Similar to columns (3) and
(4) with exogenous PTAs, we estimate models (7) and (8) with endogenous PTAs where
the difference lies in the polynomial function about η̂ij which is present in column (8)
but not in (7). The coefficients of the polynomial function are jointly significant (in both
the exogenous case in column (4) as well as in column (8) where PTA is endogenous)
suggesting some role for firm heterogeneity and/or error correlation between the decision
to trade and trade flows.22
−− Table 3 −−
Consider the model imposing exogeneity first. Every variable has two associated pa-
rameters, one corresponding to the extensive margin in column (2) and one for the in-
tensive margin of trade in column (3) or column (4). Almost all coefficients have the
same sign in the extensive versus the intensive margin models. Exceptions are BORD,
CURCOL, and POLCOMP – the latter being insignificant in column (2) –, which appear
to be impediments to start trading but foster trade flows once exports are positive. The
result about BORD and CURCOL is in line with previous research (see Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein, 2008).
To give an impression of the implied effect on trade flows, Table 4 shows the to-
tal partial effect of PTA on trade. By partial effect we mean here the effect that PTA
has on exports keeping everything else constant, including the general equilibrium ef-
fects which work through the change in the multilateral resistance terms: E(X|PTA =
1, Z)/E(X|PTA = 0, Z) − 1. A quantification by means of counterfactual analysis, tak-
ing into account third-country effects present in the MR terms in (15) and GDP through
equation (13) is reported in Section 7.
−− Table 4 −−
22We also compared the models based on goodness-of-fit (not reported). The estimated mean square
error (MSE) of the two-part model with η̂-terms is about 15% lower than the other two-part model’s. In
turn, this two-part model has a MSE which is substantially lower than that of a conventional log-linear
Heckit or parametric Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein (2008) estimator.
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With an estimated coefficient of δˆ = 0.55, the partial effect in the single index model
from Table 2 is 75% (= exp(δˆ) − 1), which is reasonably close to the total partial effect
at the average in the two-part model, 68% (= [Φ(Q′ijωˆ + κˆ)/Φ(Q¯ij
′
ωˆ)] exp(δˆ) − 1, where
sample averages are used for the variables in Qij), so that we may say that they indeed
measure the same quantity. The two-part model allows us to decompose this total effect
into the contributions from the extensive and intensive margin:
E(X|PTA = 1, Z)− E(X|PTA = 0, Z)
E(X|PTA = 0, Z) =
Φ(Q′ω + κ)− Φ(Q′ω)
Φ(Q′ω)
(exp(δ) + 1)
2
+ [exp(δ)− 1]Φ(Q
′ω + κ) + Φ(Q′ω)
Φ(Q′ω)
where the first term is the partial effect at the extensive margin and the second term the
one at the intensive margin. Evaluated at the average of the explanatory variables, these
are estimated to be 20%-points and 48%-points, respectively, in our sample. I.e., around
70% of the partial effect is found to be attributable to the intensive country margin.
Let us contrast this finding with the results obtained when letting PTA be poten-
tially endogenous. We use the same variables here as before – COLONY, COMCOL and
SMCTRY– as identifying instruments for PTA in the two equations for Iij (column 6)
and positive exports (columns 7 and 8). As the distributional assumption identifies the
bivariate probit model, we can test the three overidentifying restrictions (OIR) with an
F-test. The null hypothesis that the restrictions hold cannot be rejected in neither part
of the model (row “p-value of F” in columns 6, 7 and 8). The instruments also pass the
OIR test in log-linearized instrumental variable models (row “p-value of OIR” in columns
6, 7 and 8)23.
Let us now discuss the results about the error correlations and the coefficient of PTA.
The estimate of ϑ is negative and significant, which is in line with our findings in Table
2. Hence, as before, selection into PTAs on unobservables is negative. A significant ρˆvξ
likewise suggests that there is endogeneity in the selection into exports decision. Here,
we find evidence of positive self-selection based on unobservables, which is reflected in
23The test has two degrees of freedom here as one instrument is needed for identification.
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the overestimation of the impact of PTA on the decision to export at all when neglecting
endogeneity of PTA. As a matter of fact, the results in Table 3 suggest that after control-
ling for endogeneity, PTA membership has an impact on the intensive margin, but does
not significantly affect the extensive margin of trade, i.e., the country intensive margin
accounts for the whole partial effect of PTA (see also the corresponding estimated partial
effects in Table 4).
Such a result could, for instance, be explained by sufficiently high market-specific fixed
entry costs which are unaffected by PTA formation, whereas marginal delivery costs are
lowered by PTA membership. Note that these results are compatible with empirical re-
search at a disaggregate level which emphasizes PTA to be important in shaping some
extensive margins of trade. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), for instance, found NAFTA to af-
fect the extensive margin at the level (i.e., the number) of products traded. Extensive
and intensive product margins are partly subsumed by, but not identical to, the coun-
try intensive margin.24 Finally, the fact that the estimated correlations are of different
signs is perfectly compatible with the general specification of the model. The differently
signed correlations suggest that, after controlling for economic and political determinants,
extensive and intensive margins of export appear to be driven by heterogeneous factors.
The remaining variables are only marginally affected by the change from the model
for exogenous PTA to the one where it is endogenous, with the sole exception here being
again BORD, which looses its significant negative impact on the extensive margin.
7 Quantification and discussion
We will illustrate the importance of considering both self-selection into PTAs and zero
export flows by means of counterfactual analysis. In particular, we will compute the
impact of PTA membership as observed in the year 2005 to a situation without any PTA
24A change at the extensive product margin as in Feenstra and Kee (2008) or Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)
would be equivalent to a change at the extensive country margin only for the first product(s) traded
bilaterally. Otherwise, an expansion at the extensive product margin for any pair of countries is measured
by an increase in the intensive country margin of exports in an aggregate analysis as ours.
27
membership in the same year, using a variety of different estimators and taking into
account general equilibrium effects addressed in Sections 2 and 6.1.
The literature on the impact of endogenous PTA formation on trade suggests a positive
parameter estimate on nominal bilateral exports. For instance, Baier and Bergstrand
(2009) report estimates of average treatment effects of in between 0.68 (using the matching
estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006), for the year 2000; implying an effect of about
97%) and 2.36 (using the same approach for the year 1990). While these estimates lie
in a similar range as the ones reported in previous work and take non-linear effects of
trade costs as possible determinants of PTA formation into account, they do not consider
non-linear general equilibrium effects of PTAs on exports. Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
acknowledge general equilibrium effects with panel data but assume that PTAmembership
is exogenous. However, the average treatment effects from their preferred models are still
very close to the cross-sectional endogenous treatment effects in their more recent paper,
amounting to 0.62 (implying an effect of about 86%) and 0.54 (implying an effect of about
72%). Relative to Baier and Bergstrand’s, Magee’s (2003) estimated PTA-effects on trade
seem rather large: they lie between 300 percent and 800 percent. However, these estimates
do not account for fixed country effects in both trade volume and PTA equation.
Unlike previous work, our quantification of PTA effects on trade flows respects general
equilibrium effects, accounts for the differential impact of PTAs on the extensive and
intensive margins of exports, and treats PTAs endogenously. Finally, we will also infer
the importance of something that did not surface in the debate about PTA effects on
trade yet: that most-favored nation tariffs are heterogeneous so that PTA membership
does not bring about identical tariff reductions across country-pairs (see Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2002, for a treatment of tariff effects in their general equilibrium model).
Starting point of the quantification are the parameter estimates summarized in Tables
2 and 3. Note that so far we did not need to rely on any specific underlying model. Our
estimation equations leading to the econometric specification for the parameter estima-
tion are perfectly consistent with a wide range of recent international trade models.25
25This is due to the fact that the differences between models pertain to country-specific variables, which
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Specifically, it captures new trade theory models with love-of-variety preferences and ho-
mogeneous firms a` la Krugman (1980), the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) exchange
economy, the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) model allowing for firm hetero-
geneity and zero trade flows, the Eaton and Kortum (2002) Ricardian model, and the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model with quasi-linear quadratic preferences and endoge-
nous mark-ups. However, if one wants to go further and run a counterfactual analysis, it
is necessary to adopt one specific model and use the implied structural model equations.
In the subsequent analysis, we apply the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework.
Hence, in addition to the parameter estimates, we use the assumption that countries are
endowment economies and exports are related to exporter and importer GDP as well as
multilateral resistance terms as in equation (1).
For a quantification of the general equilibrium-consistent average treatment effect of
observed PTA membership on exports, we need to determine counterfactual bilateral
exports in the absence of PTA membership. For this, we set the binary PTA indicator to
zero and solve the system of 2N equations of exporter and importer MR terms in (15).26
This can be done by assuming that PTA membership is associated with heterogeneous
tariff reductions or not.27 Irrespective of whether heterogeneous tariffs are acknowledged
or not, PTA formation has an impact on GDP and the latter has to be considered in
the solution of (15) and in the outcome equation for the intensive margin of exports, i.e.,
in (14). Tables 5a and 5b summarize the predicted effects of PTA formation on trade
are captured by country-fixed effects in our estimation equations.
26Since σ, the elasticity of substitution between products, is not known, its level has to be estimated
or to be assumed. In the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it can not be estimated since
the model does not impose enough structure. So, we follow them in setting σ = 5. Note that they find
trade predictions to be fairly insensitive to the choice of different values of σ. (If one used a model which
specified the supply side explicitly – such as a multi-country version of Krugman’s (1980) model – one
would be able to estimate σ.)
27To account for heterogeneous tariffs, we use data on tariff revenues in total trade flows from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2007, assume that tariff rates are identical vis-a`-vis all PTA
nonmembers, and apply these tariffs to trade flows of all trading partners of a country in the counterfactual
abolishment of preferential trade liberalization. In principal, one could replace PTAij by an appropriately
defined (endogenous) tariff variable and apply the framework suggested here. However, tariffs may be
inaccurately measured and PTA membership may entail more than just a bilateral reduction in tariffs.
Therefore, we prefer approximating tariff effects as indicated but employ the binary indicator variable in
the regressions.
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among PTA members relative to non-members for the models estimated in Tables 2 and
3, respectively.28 For each model, we distinguish between effects that assume that PTAs
alter homogeneous tariffs (in Table 5a) preferentially versus ones that alter heterogeneous
tariffs (in Table 5b).
−− Tables 5a and 5b −−
In a nutshell, the figures in the tables suggest the following conclusions. First, trade
among PTA members increases due to preferential tariff abolition. For instance, the model
which assumes exogenous PTA formation, no specific process for the extensive margin to
export, and no heterogeneous tariff effect on trade and GDP points to an increase in
nominal exports among PTA members relative to nonmembers by about 59% relative
to an equilibrium without any PTAs. This is reflected in the number which is given in
the outer left column of the top row of Table 5a labeled “Average percentage increase of
trade flows of members in excess of non-members.” The estimated effect is about 102
percentage points higher with endogenous PTA formation (about 161% higher exports
among PTA members relative to nonmembers than without PTAs; see the results in the
column labeled (3)-(4) at the top of Table 5a). Ignoring the heterogeneity of tariffs brings
about a negligible bias in our application.29 To see the latter, compare the results at the
top of Table 5a with the corresponding ones in Table 5b.
Modeling the process of endogenous selection into positive exports separate from the
non-linear process of positive exports is relatively important. It raises the predicted effect
of PTA formation with endogenous PTAs on insiders’ trade relative to other country-
pairs – in the column labeled (5)-(7) of Table 5a the estimated comparative static effect
of PTA membership amounts to 219% which exceeds the one-part model-based result of
161% by about 58 percentage points. In the two-part model which allows for correlated
28According to Walras’ law, absolute trade effects are impossible to gauge in general but they have to
be expressed relative to one country-pair or relative to a group of pairs.
29In all models, the predicted effect of PTA membership on members’ versus nonmembers’ bilateral
trade is slightly lower when considering heterogeneity of most-favored nation tariffs. The relatively small
bias from ignoring tariff heterogeneity has to do with the fact that, on average, most-favored nation
tariffs are relatively homogeneous across countries in 2005 so that capturing tariff effects by a binary
PTA indicator variable does not conceal much information.
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disturbances between the extensive and intensive country margin equations at the outer
right of Table 5a, the corresponding estimated comparative static effect is about 235%.
Of the latter effect on exports, the lion’s share is contributed by the intensive margin.30
Overall, the estimated (long-run) effects of PTA membership on bilateral trade are quite
large.
Moreover, Tables 5a and 5b indicate that a focus on PTA effects on average trade flows
– as had been done in most of the previous work on endogenous PTA effects on trade
flows – conceals the sizable variation effects across country pairs.31 To see this, consider
the two blocs of results in the lower parts of Tables 5a and 5b. There, we report four
moments of the distribution of the percentage changes of bilateral exports both of PTA
members (at the center of each table) as well as of non-members (at the very bottom of
each table): the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum effect for
each model.32 Obviously, most of the models display a standard deviation of effects within
the groups of PTA members and non-members, which exceeds the average effect. The
variation in the effects is entirely due to the relevance of heterogeneity across countries in
general equilibrium. Hence, the underlying theoretical model suggests that the treatment
effect of PTA membership is inherently heterogeneous. The results even point to negative
30Of 9,891 country-pairs with predicted positive bilateral exports in the cum-PTA benchmark equi-
librium, 69 are predicted to stop exporting if all PTAs were abandoned when using the exogenous-PTA
probit model in column (2) of Table 3. With the endogenous-PTA model in column (6) of Table 3, 106
are predicted to stop exporting in counterfactual general equilibrium relative to the benchmark equilib-
rium. This result is based on estimates which disregard the fact that (most-favored nation) tariffs are
heterogeneous across countries so that preferential trade liberalization is associated with tariff reductions
of different magnitude across country-pairs. In order to disentangle PTA-induced effects on exports that
arise through changes at the extensive and intensive margins of trade we proceeded as follows. First, we
calculated the total effect on trade by using estimates of the two-part model with endogenous PTAs –
including effects on the extensive and intensive margins. Then, we calculated an alternative counterfac-
tual by holding the margin constant at the benchmark equilibrium. The latter, leads to results that are
very similar to the ones for the one-part models, where endogenous selection into positive exports is not
accounted for.
31That treatment effects tend to be heterogeneous across the treated is widely acknowledged in other
fields of economics (see Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes, 2005, for an example in public economics). However,
empirical international economists tend to focus on average effects of treatments such as PTA membership
and other treatments on outcome of interest and tend to ignore that theoretical models often would suggest
heterogeneous treatment effects.
32Notice that, for all two-part models, we provide these figures only for the sub-sample of country-pairs
with positive exports.
31
effects from the simultaneous implementation of PTAs in the world economy on some PTA
members (accruing to third country effects of foreign PTAs). Similarly, there are even
PTA non-members which gain from the simultaneous implementation of foreign PTAs.
PTA members face positive and PTA non-members negative effects of PTA formation on
trade flows only on average.
Altogether, these findings suggest that the empirical models proposed here may help
to estimate effects of endogenous PTA effects on trade flows which have appeal from both
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. First, proposed models principally allow for
a disproportionate number of zero trade flows and endogenous PTA membership which
previously proposed estimators for gravity models did not allow for (and accommodated
only one or the other). Second, the proposed models allow for estimation of effects which
fully account for general equilibrium effects of PTA membership associated with GDP
responses to membership and ultimately heterogeneous treatment effects of PTA forma-
tion. For instance, recently proposed micro-econometric methods (such as propensity
score matching or switching regression) did not share this feature.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes non-linear econometric techniques for the analysis of trade policy
effects on bilateral trade flows which subsume three features: they pay specific attention
to zeros in bilateral trade matrices; they allow trade policy variables – such as binary
preferential trade agreement (PTA) indicators but eventually also continuous trade policy
measures – to be endogenous; and they account for non-linear effects of trade policy and
trade costs in stylized general equilibrium models. All of these features have been judged
as being important in recent empirical work in international economics, but no attempt
has been made to address them in a unified framework as we do.
Apart from addressing the issue from an econometric perspective and from summa-
rizing methodical frameworks for empirical work on the matter, we apply the suggested
procedures to estimate general equilibrium-consistent effects of PTA membership on bilat-
32
eral trade flows in a cross-sectional data-set for the year 2005. For this, we have to assume
a specific general equilibrium structure, and we rely on the one proposed by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) for convenience.
The obtained results suggest that ignoring endogenous selection into PTAs is relatively
harmful. The impact of endogenous PTAs on members’ relative to nonmembers’ trade
flows is about 188 percentage points higher than in a model which assumes PTA mem-
bership to be exogenous. With the data-set at hand, the process of zero versus positive
exports should be modeled separately from the one of positive exports. Ignoring the latter
leads to a downward bias of the predicted trade effects of PTAs by about 73 percentage
points as compared to the preferred model.
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Appendix
A Country coverage (126 economies)
The following set of countries is covered in our data-set:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Rep. Iran,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Rep. Korea, Kuwait,
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Van-
uatu, RB Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
B PTA coverage (121 agreements)
Our data-set includes all PTAs notified to the World Trade Organization that are active
since 2005 or earlier. The data are augmented and corrected by using information from
38
PTA secretariat web-pages. This leads to a coverage of the following PTAs in our data-set:
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania
and Bulgaria, Albania and FYR Macedonia, Albania and Moldova, Albania and Roma-
nia, Armenia and Kazakhstan, Armenia and Moldova, Armenia and Russian Federation,
Armenia and Turkmenistan, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Baltic
Free Trade Area (BAFTA), Bangkok Agreement, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria and Israel, Bulgaria and Turkey, Central
American Common Market (CACM), Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Carta-
gena Agreement, CAN), Canada and Chile, Canada and Israel, Canada and Costa Rica,
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA),
Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER), Chile and
Costa Rica, Chile and El Salvador, Chile and Mexico, Commonwealth of Independent
States Free Trade Agreement (CIS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Croatia and Albania, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and
FYR Macedonia, East African Community Treaty (EAC), Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity (EAEC), European Community (EC), EC and Algeria, EC and Bulgaria, EC and
Chile, EC and Croatia, EC and Egypt, EC and FYR Macedonia, EC and Iceland, EC
and Israel, EC and Jordan, EC and Lebanon, EC and Mexico, EC and Morocco, EC and
Norway, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), EC and Romania, EC and South
Africa, EC and Switzerland and Liechtenstein, EC and Syria, EC and Tunesia, EC and
Turkey, Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA), EFTA and Bulgaria, EFTA and Chile, EFTA and Croatia, EFTA
and FYR Macedonia, EFTA and Israel, EFTA and Jordan, EFTA and Mexico, EFTA
and Morocco, EFTA and Romania, EFTA and Singapor, EFTA and Tunisia, EFTA and
Turkey, FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Unified Economic Agreement
between the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Georgia and Armenia,
Georgia and Kazakhstan, Georgia and Russian Federation, Georgia and Turkmenistan,
Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP), India and
Sri Lanka, Israel and Turkey, Japan and Mexico, Japan and Singapor, Kyrgyz Republic
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and Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova, Kyrgyz
Republic and Russian Federation, Asociacio´n Latinoamericana de Integracio´n (ALADI,
LAIA), Mercado Comu´n del Sur (MERCOSUR), Mexico and Israel, Moldova and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Moldova and Bulgaria, Moldova and Croatia, Moldova and FYR Mace-
donia, Melanesian Spearhead Group Free Trade Area Agreement (MSG), North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), New Zealand and Singapore, Panama and El Salvador,
Papua New Guinea - Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement (PATCRA),
Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries (PTN), Rep. of
Korea and Chile, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and FYR Macedo-
nia, Romania and Israel, Romania and Moldova, Romania and Turkey, Southern African
Development Community (SADC), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), Singapore and Australia, South Pacific Re-
gional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), Thailand and Aus-
tralia, TRIPARTITE, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey and Croatia, Turkey
and FYR Macedonia, United States and Chile, United States and Isreal, United States
and Jordan, United States and Singapore, Unites States and Australia, Traite Modifie´ de
l’Union E´conomique et Mone´taire Ouest Africaine (WAEMU/UEMOA).
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Table 2: Estimation results for gravity models for trade
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Regression E(ln(Xij)) E(Xij|·) Pr(PTAij = 1|·) E(Xij|·)
Estimator OLS Poisson PML Probit ML Poisson PML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PTA 0.3943 0.5548 — 1.1471
(0.0499) (0.1256) (0.3838)
DIST -1.2342 -0.4998 -1.0737 -0.3971
(0.0417) (0.0492) (0.0403) (0.0675)
BORD 0.7264 0.7263 -0.4687 0.7405
(0.1115) (0.0726) (0.1292) (0.0748)
LANG 0.6490 0.1553 -0.1193 0.2079
(0.0555) (0.0813) (0.0626) (0.0698)
CONT -0.0143 0.2736 0.7650 0.1506
(0.0549) (0.1222) (0.0479) (0.1579)
DURAB -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0072 -0.0041
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
POLCOMP 0.0106 0.0737 -0.0483 0.1044
(0.0010) (0.0327) (0.0091) (0.0271)
AUTOC -0.3784 -0.1039 0.0480 -0.1391
(0.0122) (0.0325) (0.0098) (0.0291)
CURCOL 1.3321 0.7246 0.5189 0.6179
(0.1402) (0.1695) (0.2468) (0.1833)
COLONY — — 0.1356 —
(0.1941)
COMCOL — — 0.5519 —
(0.0719)
SMCTRY — — 1.2275 —
(0.2496)
ϑˆ — — — -0.3708
(0.1810)
F-stat. — — 88.7790 2.4949
p-value of F — — 0.0000 0.4762
F-stat. OIR — — — 1.4530
p-value of OIR — — — 0.4836
Observations 9891 15750 15750 15750
Countries 126 126 126 126
Notes:
The sources of the data are the United Nations’ World Trade Database and the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales.
All regressions include importer and exporter fixed effects. The last two columns indicate results
where PTA was instrumented. ϑˆ is a measure for potential endogeneity of PTAij . “F-stat.”
and “p-value of F” refer to a test of joint significance of COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY in
the respective equation. The F-statistic should be significantly different from zero in column (4)
but not in column (5). ”F-stat. OIR” and ”p-value of OIR” refer to a test for over-identifying
restrictions in the corresponding log-linear IV model.
Table 3: Estimation results for two-part gravity models for trade
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Regression Pr(X > 0)E(X|X > 0) E(X|X > 0) Pr(PTA = 1) Pr(X > 0) E(X|X > 0) E(X|X > 0)
Estimator Probit Poisson Poisson Biv.Probit Biv.Probit Poisson Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PTA 0.3515 0.3698 0.3642 — -0.0307 1.2118 1.2701
(0.0559) (0.0711) (0.0706) (0.1326) (0.3715) (0.3961)
DIST -1.1454 -0.6209 -0.6049 -1.0689 -0.9448 -0.3873 -0.4958
(0.0466) (0.0344) (0.0395) (0.0388) (0.0434) (0.0670) (0.1135)
BORD -0.4276 0.6478 0.6948 -0.4469 -0.0647 0.7566 0.8124
(0.1848) (0.0596) (0.0603) (0.1184) (0.1673) (0.0759) (0.0812)
LANG 0.6341 0.2108 0.1907 -0.0974 0.6258 0.2241 0.2368
(0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0613) (0.0616) (0.0616) 0.0655) 0.0922)
CONT 0.1041 0.2897 0.2926 0.7794 0.3095 0.0930 -0.0797
(0.0596) (0.0656) (0.0642) (0.0479) (0.0581) (0.1568) (0.1531)
DURAB -0.0070 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0071 -0.0018 -0.0043 -0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009)
POLCOMP -0.0027 0.0804 0.0918 -0.0483 0.0042 0.0947 0.0920
(0.0087) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0262) (0.0269)
AUTOC 0.0011 -0.0594 -0.0681 0.0479 -0.0069 -0.1296 -0.1283
(0.0093) (0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0305) (0.0317)
CURCOL -0.1339 0.3802 0.3685 0.5218 -0.1638 0.5391 0.4842
(0.3752) (0.1872) (0.1807) (0.2377) (0.3396) (0.1784) (0.1788)
(η̂ij)2 — — -0.0377 — — — -0.1129
(0.0044) (0.0483)
(η̂ij)3 — — 0.0094 — — — 0.0359
(0.0012) (0.0365)
(η̂ij)4 — — -0.0006 — — — -0.0053
(0.0001) (0.0063)
COLONY — — — 0.1318 — — —
(0.1899)
COMCOL — — — 0.4505 — — —
(0.0757)
SMCTRY — — — 1.2244 — — —
(0.2210)
ρˆvξ — — — — 0.2895 — —
(0.0834)
ϑˆ — — — — — -0.4016 -0.4373
(0.1710) (0.1770)
F-stat. — — 48.4092 3.7782 1.6329 5.5857
p-value of F — — 0.0000 0.2864 0.6519 0.1336
F-stat. OIR — — — 2.6605 1.4530 3.0029
p-value of OIR — — — 0.1029 0.4836 0.2228
Obs. 13500 9891 9891 15750 15750 9891 9891
Countries 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
Notes:
All regressions include importer and exporter fixed effects. In the second column, the number of observations is reduced due to countries
that export to the whole “world” and which are dropped from the estimation. These are Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, China, Germany,
Denmark, Finland, France, GB, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and USA.
The sources of the data are the United Nations’ World Trade Database and the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter-
nationales. ”F-stat.” and ”p-value of F” refer to a test of joint significance of COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY in the respective
equation. The F-statistic should be significantly different from zero in column (5) but not in (6)-(8). ”F-stat. OIR” and ”p-value of
OIR” refer to a test for over-identifying restrictions in the corresponding log-linear IV model.
Table 4: Partial (i.e., non-general-equilibrium) effects of PTA
Model Total Decomposition
Ext. Marg. Int. Marg.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exogenous PTA
Single index 74.15% — —
Table 2, col. (2)
Two-part 67.92% 19.59% 48.33%
Table 3, col. (2),(3)
Two-part with η̂ij-terms 66.98% 19.52% 47.45%
Table 3, col. (2),(4)
Endogenous PTA
Single index 214.90% — —
Table 2, col. (3),(4)
Two-part 235.02% -0.60% 235.62%
Table 3, col. (5),(6)
Two-part with η̂ij-terms 255.12% -.63% 255.75%
Table 3, col. (5),(7)
Notes:
Ext. Marg. and Int. Marg. are the partial effects of PTA membership on the extensive
and intensive margins of exports, respectively. Partial effects for two-part models are
evaluated at the average of explanatory variables.
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